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ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS INCORRECTLY STATED THE
LAW PERTAINING TO THE EXISTENCE OF LEGAL DUTIES
AND CONTRACT FORMATION.

The Utah Court of Appeals held that "[w]hether a contract to procure insurance or a
duty to procure a policy of insurance ultimately exists, are questions of fact best left to the
trier of fact.,, Harris v. Albrecht. 2002 UT App 98,1f 29, n.6, 46 P.3d 241. Even Harris
admits in his brief that this statement is ''unfortunately-worded,'' (Harris' Brief, p. 17) and
concedes that "where the operative facts [are] not in dispute" the determination of
whether a contract or duty exists is a "pure question of law." (Harris' Brief, pp. 17, 35
n.12.)
However, Harris nonetheless believes the decision of the Court of Appeals should be
affirmed, claiming the existence of disputed "operative facts." As explained below, no
such dispute exists for purposes of summary judgment.
II.

NO UNDERLYING OR SUBSIDIARY FACTUAL QUESTIONS
PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

There are no questions of material fact that would preclude the making of a legal
decision as to whether a duty or contract to procure exists in this case. It is true that in
some instances a jury may have to resolve disputed "subsidiary issues of fact" before a
court can make the ultimate legal determination regarding the existence of a contract or
legal duty. See O'Hara v. Hall. 628 P.2d 1289 (Utah 1981). According to Harris, the
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following "underlying factual question" precludes summary judgment in the present case:
Harris maintains that he instructed Albrecht to procure insurance for his business,
and that Albrecht agreed. See R. at 330. Albrecht denies that Harris ever gave
such an instruction, and denies that he ever agreed. See Brief of Appellants, at
7. This is a classic factual dispute. Until this factual dispute is decided, no court
(whether the district court, court of appeals or this Court) can decide the
overarching legal issues regarding the existence of a duty.. J
(Harris' Brief, pp. 22, 35 n.12) (emphasis added.) Thus Harris contends summary
judgment is inappropriate.
However, the "classic factual dispute" over the alleged phone conversation was not an
issue for purposes of summary judgment. Albrecht2 conceded the issue for purposes of
the motion. R. 216 fll 19). This was acknowledged by the Court of Appeals in footnote 3
of its decision: "Albrecht denies making such statement. However, Albrecht argues that
!

- Strangely, after asserting that the existence of duty could not be decided until the
factual issue was resolved, Harris asserts that the Court of Appeals did decide implicitly
that a duty existed:
the court of appeals in essence decided (without explicitly saying so), that,
based on the facts as alleged by Harris, Albrecht did have a duty to exercise
reasonable care in the procurement of insurance, but that final
determination of the legal question would have to await the factfinder's
resolution of the underlying factual dispute. This determination was
correct.
(Harris' Brief, p. 22 n. 7) (emphasis in original). However, Harris' characterization is
inaccurate. The Court of Appeals very clearly stated that "we do not decide today that a
contract or a duty exists." Harris, 2002 UT App 98,1f29 n.6, 46 P.3d 241. Therefore,
contrary to Harris' contention, the Court of Appeals did not implicitly find that a duty
existed.
2

Just as in the opening brief, "Albrecht" will refer to all the appellants collectively.
2

even if he did make such a statement, it neither established a contract to procure
insurance nor a duty to procure insurance" Harris, 2002 UT App 98, \ 4 n.3, 46 P.3d
241 (emphasis added).3 Likewise, Justice Davis in his dissent expressly acknowledged
the absence of any dispute over this fact (for summary judgment purposes) stating that the
motion was "based on a given set of facts." Id at If 31 (Davis, J., dissenting).4 Further,
the argument of whether the terms and circumstances are too indefinite to give rise to
legal obligations implies that the facts are being challenged only as to their legal
sufficiency.
As long as it is assumed for purposes of argument that the alleged conversation did
take place, it is appropriate for a court to decide the ''overarching legal issues regarding
3

At the trial court level and before the Court of Appeals Albrecht disputed making
the statement, but for purposes of summary judgment asked that it be assumed the
statement was made.
4

The majority of the Court of Appeals held that summary judgment was precluded
because the jury needed to consider four particular facts. Id at ^J 27. However, the four
facts referred to were either expressly or implicitly undisputed and/or immaterial for
purposes of summary judgment. First, Albrecht did not dispute for purposes of summary
judgment that he and Harris had an on-going, eight-year, relationship. As noted by
Albrecht in the record, Harris had purchased policies through Albrecht including
automobile policies, a homeowner's policy, boat insurance, R.V. insurance, and a liability
policy. R. 427. Second, Albrecht did not dispute for purposes of summary judgment that
the parties regularK conducted business over the phone. R. 424. Third, and related to the
second, Albrecht did not dispute for purposes of summary judgment that Harris rarely
discussed with Albrecht the particulars of insurance coverage sought by Harris. Id.
Fourth, Albrecht did not dispute, for purposes of summary judgment, the assertion that
Harris told Albrecht that he wanted to place business coverage on his office and its
contents and, in response, that Albrecht replied he would take care of it and that he would
come out and look at the equipment. R. 216 fl| 19).
3

the existence of a duty." (Harris' Brief, p. 22.) Therefore, there are no factual questions
precluding summary judgment.
A somewhat similar scenario arose in the case of Gabrielson v. Warnemunde, 443
N.W.2d 540 (Minn. 1989), where the plaintiff sued an insurance agent for failing to cover
a boat under a homeowner's policy. A factual dispute existed, but the defendant, "for the
purposes of the motion for summary judgment. . . accepted Lacanne's version of the facts
. . . " Id at 543. The trial court granted summary judgment holding there was no duty
even under the plaintiffs version of the facts. The court of appeals reversed stating that
the jury should determine whether the facts and circumstances of the case gave rise to a
duty. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Minnesota, the court of appeals was reversed on
the following basis:
The court of appeals held that his case should go to the jury for a determination of
whether the facts and circumstances of the case give rise to a duty of care owed by
Warnemundc to LaCanne. This is erroneous. The existence of a legal duty is a
question for the court, not the jury. . . . The existence of a legal duty depends on
the factual circumstances of each case. It is not, however, the jury's function to
determine whether the facts give rise to a duty.
Id. at n.l. The court then reversed the court of appeals, stating that "[ujnder the present
facts, the trial court was correct in concluding that no duty existed." IcL at 545.
Like Gabrielson, Albrecht conceded the facts for purposes of summary judgment, and
it therefore was the duty of the Court of Appeals to determine whether a duty or contract
existed based on that given set of facts. As stated in Gabrielson, wtit is not. . . the jury's
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function to determine whether the facts give rise to a duty." Id

III.

THERE WAS NO SOURCE FROM WHICH THE TERMS OF A
POLICY FOR HARRIS' BUSINESS, NOR THE CONTENTS
THEREOF, COULD HAVE BEEN IMPLIED - THEREFORE,
NO CONTRACT TO PROCURE WAS CREATED.

The important rule of law stated in the cases cited by Harris in his brief is that in
order to form a valid contract to procure insurance, all of the essential terms of the
ultimate insurance contract must at least be capable of being implied from other sources
or circumstances. See Hamachcr v. Tumy. 352 P.2d 493, 497 (Or. 1960). Despite
Harris' contentions, there was no source from which the terms of a policy for Harris1
business, nor the contents thereof, could have been implied. Therefore, no contract to
procure was created.
A)

Harris' Argument of Implying Terms and Contents from a "Standard
Policy".or Sales Brochure Is Flawed.

Contrary to Harris' contention, there was no basis for Albrecht to imply from a
brochure or "standard policy"' what Harris' contents may have been, or what options,
coverages, limits, etc. Harris would have desired. Although Harris points out that
Albrecht referred to a "standard policy" in the briefing below (Hams' Brief, p. 44 n.16),
there is no such thing as a "standard policy" in the sense used by Harris. R. 159 (pp. 33,
35,51-52, 83-84). There are certain automatic coverages included in a policy once
contents have been identified, and options, limits, deductibles, other coverages, etc. have
been decided by the prospective insured. R. 159 (pp. 17, 61, 143); R. 365-362. However,
5

there is no "standard policy" that could be defaulted to without certain crucial information
from the prospective insured, e.g., contents, etc. R. 159 (pp. 33. 35, 51-52, 83-84).
It is not difficult to illustrate why implying contents or terms from a brochure or
"standard policy" would not have been possible in this case. For instance, if Albrecht
were to "cut and paste" the automatic coverages from the sales brochure as Harris argues,
Harris would have received $5,000 in valuable papers coverage.^ R. 159 (pp. 17, 61,
143); R. 365-362. Harris claims $940,000 for lost valuable papers, not $5,000. R. 205,
390. Thus, an agent is clearly not justified in speculating as to a prospective insured's
property or insurance needs, as argued by Harris.
B)

Harris' Argument Regarding the Parties' Prior Dealings is Flawed.

Harris argues that in the past, Albrecht had always been able to procure automobile or
similar policies with limited information, and therefore Albrecht should have done so on
Harris' business. However, in their prior dealings, Harris at least identified for Albrecht
the object or objects to be insured. For instance, Harris states: "[a]s it worked, Harris
would call Albrecht, tell him, for instance, what type of car he wanted to add, and
Albrecht would place the coverage." (Harris' Brief, p. 32) (emphasis added.) Unlike
this, Harris never told Albrecht what the contents of his business were.
Further, Harris never before had a business policy, and because Albrecht had no
knowledge of the contents of Harris' business nor of the terms Harris may have desired,
5

Assuming State Farm would have been willing to insure Harris.
6

R. 186 (pp. 107-09), there was no source from which to imply the contents or terms of a
policy.
C)

The Cases Cited by Harris Regarding Contracts to Procure Insurance
Are Either Inapposite, Or, Actually Support Albrechfs Position.

The cases cited by Harris regarding contracts to procure insurance are either
inapposite, or, actual support Albrechf s position. For instance, Harris cites Lakeview
Farms, Inc.. v. Patten, 640 N.E.2d 1092 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) in support of his case.
However, in Lakeview, just like Albrecht presently argues, the court held that the alleged
contract to procure insurance was insufficiently definite to be enforced. Because there
was no course of dealing from which to infer the essential terms, a verdict for the plaintiff
was reversed. Thus, Lakeview entirely supports Albrechf s position, not Harris'. Further.
Lakeview does not involve an insurance agent situation. Lakeview involved an
employer's promise to procure medical insurance for an employee.
Harris also cites the case of Hamacher v. Tumv, 352 P.2d 493 (Or. 1960), wherein a
prospective insured brought an action against certain insurance agents ("agents") for their
alleged failure to procure insurance on buildings owned by the plaintiff. The plaintiff was
an owner of a saw and planing mill that were already insured. The policy limited the
insurance company's liability for claims to 90% of the actual cash value of the property at
the time of a loss, up to $170,000. The plaintiff subsequently made substantial
improvements to the mill. An appraisal showed the property value had increased to
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$226,000.00. The plaintiff made even more improvements after the appraisal, increasing
the property value further. Consequently, the plaintiff and one of the agents met to
discuss the possibility of increasing the amount of insurance for the mill. The agent
suggested the insurance be increased to 95% of the current insurable value of the mill.
The plaintiff decided he would do that. The plaintiff provided the agent with a written
appraisal report for the mill and the agent took the report to his office to determine the
total insurable value of the mill. Before the agent could return to discuss the insurance
value, a fire damaged plaintiffs mills to the extent of $174,166.58. At the time of the
fire, the defendants had not procured additional insurance and the plaintiff recovered only
$139,396.29. The plaintiff sued the agents for the remaining uncovered amounts and was
defeated at the trial court level.
On appeal, the court recognized the rule that, before a party can have a duty to procure
insurance, there must be an agreement on all the essential elements of the contract to be
procured:
[w]here a person seeks to enter into a contract of insurance with an insurance
company or its agent it is understood that the negotiations will not ripen into a
contract until the parties arrive at an agreement as to all the elements which
are essential to an insurance contract, including the subject matter to be
covered, the risk insured against, the amount of indemnity, the duration of
the coverage and the premium.
Hamaeher, 352 P.2d at 349 (emphasis added). The court also stated that, absent sufficient
information from the insured to enable the agent to obtain the insurance, no liability for
failure to procure can attach:
8

Obviously, liability for failure to procure insurance could not arise unless the agent
had sufficiently definite directions from his principal to consummate the final
insurance contract.
Id
The trial court in Hamacher was reversed and the case was remanded based largely on
the trial court's instruction to the jury that a contract to procure insurance must be proven
with the same certainty as a contract of insurance. Id. at 496. Since the plaintiff and
defendants had insured the mills under a prior policy, the court held that, in that instance,
a jury might use that prior course of dealing to ascertain the essential elements of the
insurance to be procured. Specifically, the Oregon Supreme Court noted that:
[t]he principal vice of the instruction is that it could be considered by the members
of the jury as prohibiting them from finding a contract to procure insurance from
the facts short of an express agreement to that effect. There were facts from
which a contract to procure insurance could reasonably be implied. As we
have already indicated, at the time of the negotiations in question there were
in existence several policies of insurance on the buildings and equipment on
the plaintiffs plant site. These policies were executed only after the
defendants had discussed with plaintiff at some length his fire insurance
program, and the terms of the policies embodied the original program upon
which the parties had reached agreement. The previous coverage is relevant
in the present case. From the fact that the parties had agreed upon a five year
term as the duration of the coverage under the policies already in force, it
would be reasonable to infer that the additional coverage was to be for the
same term.
Id. at 497-98 (emphasis added, quoting Patterson, Principles of Insurance Law (2nd Ed.) p.
88). Thus, in Hamacher, the Court held that a contract to procure could exist absent an
express agreement so long as the essential terms could be implied from "policies already
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in force." Hamacher, 352 P.2d at 497-98.
Applying Hamacher to this case, Harris cannot prevail because, as already explained,
there was no prior course of dealing for business insurance from which the essential terms
could be implied.
The other cases cited by Harris are like Hamacher, in that they acknowledge the
general rule requiring agreement on all essential contract terms, at least by implication.
See Bulla v. Donahue, 366 N.E.2d 233, 236 (Ind. App. 1977) (holding that the "terms and
conditions of the proposed policy need to be sufficiently definite to enable the agent or
broker to procure a policy consistent with the applicant's insurance needs'*); Marshel
In\cstments. Inc. v. Cohen, 634 P.2d 133, 141 (Kan. App. 1981) ("we do not question the
general rule that to prove the existence of an agreement there must be evidence of
reasonable definiteness that there was a meeting of the parties' minds upon subject matter
and terms. . . ."); Olvera v. Charles Z. Flack Agency, Inc., 415 S.E.2d 760, 762 (N.C.
App. 1992) ("determining whether an agent has undertaken to procure a policy of
insurance, a court must look to the conduct of the parties and the communications
between them"); Rena, Inc. v. T.W. Brien, Underwriters, 708 A.2d 747 (N.J. Sup. Ct.
App. Div. 1998) (if no express agreement, terms must at least be found by implication).
In Bulla, the plaintiffs sued an insurance agent for failing to obtain automobile
coverage. One of the plaintiffs went to her agent's office with her current policy and
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informed the agent she wanted the same coverages. The agent then placed a call to
another agent in order to obtain lower premiums and the second agent was given five
pages containing the plaintiffs' prior insurance information. The plaintiffs also executed
a check for the premium and sent the check and the information to the second agent.
Upon receipt of the information and the check, the second agent decided he did not want
the business and he failed to submit the information to an insurance company. However,
he did not inform either the first agent nor the plaintiffs that coverage would not be
placed through him. Soon afterward, one of the plaintiffs' automobiles was involved in
an accident.
The court held the second insurance agent liable for failure to procure an insurance
policy and found the insured had given the second agent sufficient information to enable
him to obtain a policy. Specifically, the court found the insured had provided the agent
with a list of the desired coverages, deductibles desired, automobiles to be insured,
drivers of the vehicles, and liens on the vehicles. In short, unlike the instant case, the
court found the list contained all of the information necessary for the second agent to
obtain a policy of insurance, as well as a premium payment.
In Marshel Investments, another case cited by Harris, an oil and gas leasehold owner
whose well burned in a fire brought an action against an insurance agent for failure to
procure "above-ground equipment" coverage for his well. The agent had asked the
plaintiff for a detailed description of the plaintiffs equipment. In response, the plaintiff
11

claimed he obtained the descriptions from an employee and then provided the
descriptions to the insurance agent, thus giving the agent the information needed to secure
the policy. See id. at 135.
In Rena, Inc., which arose out of a fire at a bar and restaurant, an owner of the
property brought an action against an insurance broker for failing to name it as an
additional insured on an insurance policy purchased by the lessee of the property. The
case involved the issue of whether an insurance agent had a duty to third persons, other
than direct clients, in certain circumstances. Rena stands for the proposition that an agent
may have a duty to persons other than the client who may reasonably expect to be covered
under an insurance policy.
A review of Rena reveals the court did not address issues similar to those currently
before the court in the present case. The Rena court did not address the issue of what
information an insurance agent would need in order to procure an insurance policy.
However, the Rena court did state that an agent would have to have information sufficient
to procure insurance for the "risks indicated." This tangential treatment of the issue
before the Court indicates that an insured would have to specifically indicate the risks
sought to be covered before the agent could reasonably be expected to procure the
insurance.
In Oivera, a coverage dispute arose after a home was destroyed by a fire. The home
was originally purchased by Willie Little, who purchased a homeowners policy for the
12

residence through Agency, an insurance broker. The homeowner then conveyed the home
to his mother and sister, who in turn sold it to the plaintiff. Five months after the plaintiff
purchased the home, a bill for the insurance policy arrived in the mail addressed to Little.
The plaintiff took the bill to Agency and told a receptionist that she wanted to pay the bill
and have the same insurance coverage switched over to her name. The receptionist took
payment for the insurance coverage and informed the plaintiff coverage would be in
effect for a year. Soon afterward the house was destroyed by a fire. After suit was filed,
the trial court granted Agency's directed verdict motion. On appeal, the court found the
plaintiff told Agency she wanted the same coverage that was already in place and she paid
the premium for the coverage. Under those facts, the court found all of the necessary
terms of a policy could be inferred.
In contrast to these cases cited b> Harris, there was no basis for Albrecht to imply
from any source the terms of a policy nor the contents for Harris' business. Albrecht had
no knowledge of the contents of Harris' business nor his alleged extensive upgrades, (R.
186 (pp. 107-09)), and Harris had never before insured the business. Without any prior
business policies or other source of information regarding Harris' business, Harris'
alleged phone conversation with Albrecht was, at best, an unenforceable agreement to
agree. See Homestead Golf Club. Inc. v. Pride Stables, 224 F.3d 1195, 1200-01 (10th Cir.
2000) (parties consummated ''[an] agreement to agree, which was wunenforceable because
[it] leaves open material terms for future consideration, and the courts cannot create these
13

terms for the parties'"). Justice Davis was correct in pointing out that the parties' actions
were preliminary, or, "amounted to little more than an inquiry about insurance." Harris,
2002 UT App 98, % 39, 46 P.3d 241.
D)

Damages are Speculative,

It is speculative to decide now what amount of insurance Harris would have ultimately
purchased or qualified for, especially in the area of valuable papers. In that respect, the
present case is similar to the case of Wagner v. Falbe, 74 N.W.2d 742 (Wis. 1956), where
the court held that the parties had not agreed on the amount of insurance to be purchased:
the amount of damages recoverable . . . of course depend on the terms of the order
which the insurance agent undertook to fulfil. In the case at bar, how much
insurance did Wagner order and Schmitz agree to obtain? . . .[U]ntil it is known
how much insurance the agent was to obtain she cannot establish in what amount
her husband was damaged because he obtained none . . .
Id. at 744 (emphasis in original). The court concluded that "[i]t was useless, then, to
submit appellant's case to the jury and the nonsuit was properly directed." Id.
Similarly, the expectation damages in the case at hand would be unascertainable by
the jury because even according to Harris, the contents of the business and policy terms
were never discussed. R. 186 (pp. 107-09).
V.

NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO PROCURE - HARRIS' ARGUMENT
THAT ALBRECHT NEGLIGENTLY FAILED TO NOTIFY HARRIS
OF THE NEED FOR "ADDITIONAL INFORMATION" FAILS AS A
MATTER OF LAW.

Harris argues that Albrecht, as part of his duty to procure, had a duty to notify Harris
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that "additional information" was needed before a business policy could be written.
Harris states:
if Albrecht had said, cKen, I'd love to insure your business but I can't until I have
some additional information,' Albrecht would likely have protected himself from
liability because Harris would have known that no policy would or could yet issue.
(Harris' Brief, p. 28 n.l 1.) However, this argument fails for the following reasons.
A)

Albrecht Had Not Yet Assumed a Duty to Procure.

There is authority that the tort duty to procure insurance arises from the contract to
procure.6 See Couch on Insurance §§ 46:49, p. 46-70, 71, 72; 46:65, p. 46-96 (3d ed.
1997); Johnson v. George Tenuta & Co.. 185 S.E.2d 732, 736 (N.C. Ct. App. 1972); Bank
of French Board Inc. v. Brvan. 83 S.E.2d 485 (N.C, 1954); Sanchez v. Martinez. 653 P.2d
897, 901 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982).7 No contract to procure was formed in this case, and
therefore there could be no negligent failure to perform any contractual duties.
At a minimum, as even Harris concedes, the request for insurance must be clear and
specific in order to trigger a duty to procure insurance. See Small v. King, 915 P.2d

6

Harris attacks this concept, which is curious (and instructive) since he claims to
be confident that all of the elements of a contract to procure are present in this case.
(Harris Brief, p. 20 n. 6.)
7

Harris suggests that these authorities are too old, just dicta, and, in any event only
stand for the proposition that a contract to procure is a sufficient, but not a necessary
condition for creating a duty to procure sounding in tort. (Harris' Brief, p. 21 n. 6).
However, Albrecht does not cite these cases as mandatory authority, just as persuasive.
Further, it can be fairly inferred from the authorities cited that the duty to procure is
derivative of the contract to procure.
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1192, 1194 (Wyo. 1996); (Harris' Brief, p. 19) (instructions must be "clear, explicit,
absolute, and unqualified"). Here, the alleged phone conversation was short, vague, and
contemplated further negotiations as Albrecht would be coming out to look at the
equipment. Thus, no duty to procure had yet been assumed by Albrecht.
B)

Albrecht Did Notify Harris That Additional Information Was Needed.

Even if Albrecht did have a duty to notify Harris that additional information was
needed, there can be no doubt that Albrecht did so inform Harris. Even according to
Harris' alleged phone conversation, Albrecht told Harris that he would come see the
"equipment," "office," and "stuff." R. 186 (pp. 117-121). Because this inspection never
took place (Harris' Brief, p. 30) (R. 186 (p. 123)), Harris had or should have had an
absolute knowledge that no policy had been issued.
C)

Whether Albrecht's Actions Warranted an Assumption by Harris That He
Was Properly Insured Is a Question of Law under the Circumstances of this
Case.

The third element of a negligent failure to procure claim requires that "the agent's
actions warranted an assumption by the client that he was properly insured." Harris v.
Albrecht, 2002 UT App 98, f 11, 46 P.3d 241. Citing to several Utah cases which hold
that the issue of "reasonable reliance" is a question of fact, Harris claims that a jury
should be allowed to decide whether he was warranted in assuming that he was properly
insured.
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However, where there is clearly no reasonable reliance, the issue of''reasonable
reliance" can be decided as a matter of law. See Gold Standard v. Getty Oil Co.. 915 P.2d
1060, 1067 (Utah 1996) (in a misrepresentation case, the court stated that no matter how
naive or inexperienced, a person or entity cannot continue to heedlessly accept a
representation in the face of subsequent contrary writings).
Albrecht's alleged actions in this case clearly did not warrant an assumption that
Harris was properly insured. Approximately, five months after the alleged conversation
(R. 186 (p. 107)); R. 7), Harris admits he still had not received a policy or bill from
Albrecht, nor had Albrecht come to visit the office to look at the equipment, and no
premium had ever been paid. See Harris. 2002 UT App 98, €f 38, 46 P.3d 241 (Davis, J.,
dissenting); R. 186 (pp. 117-121). Thus. Justice Davis was correct in his dissent by
stating that the third element of a negligent failure to procure claim was not met as a
matter of law. See Harris. 2002 UT App 98,1j 38, 46 P.3d 241 (Davis. J., dissenting).
D)

The Cases Cited by Harris Regarding Duty to Procure Insurance Are
Either Inapposite, Or, Actually Support Albrecht's Position.

The cases cited by Harris regarding duty to procure insurance are either inapposite,8
8

The case of Industrial Development Associations v. F.T.P.. 591 A.2d 682 (N.J.
Super. Ct. 1991) cited by Harris is entirely inapposite to the issue of when an agent's duty
to procure is triggered. In that case, an excess insurance broker was inspecting the
premises and discovered that the sprinkler system was inoperative. The broker did not
tell anyone. The case revolved around whether the broker had a duty to inform the other
parties and insurers that the system was inoperative. IcL 472. The case has nothing to do
with whether a prospective insured's conversation with an agent was legally sufficient to
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or, actually support Albrechf s position. Many of Harris' cases involve situations where
the insured has already given specific directions to the agent as to what should be insured,
and the agent subsequently fails to obtain the insurance, or, mistakenly obtains inadequate
or incorrect coverage. For instance, in Black v. Illinois Fair Plan Association. 409 N.E.2d
549 (111. Ct. App. 1980), but unlike the case at hand, the insured gave the agent all the
information needed to procure a fire insurance policy for his new parcel of real property
and a policy was procured, except the agent mistakenly wrote the wrong address on the
application, causing the wrong property to be insured. This is different from the case at
hand in that Harris never told Albrecht what the contents of his business were.
In Shapiro v. Amalgamated Trust and Savings Bank, 283 111. App. 243 (1935), another
case cited by Harris, an existing policy was at issue. The buildings to be insured were
specifically identified, a policy was delivered to the insured, and premiums were paid.

trigger a duty on the part of the agent to procure insurance.
Harris also cites Gabrielson v. Warnemunde, 443 N.W.2d 540 (Minn. 1989),
which is also inapposite to this case because Gabrielson dealt with what constitutes
"special circumstances" as would increase the scope of the agenf s duty of care.
Incidentally, however, Gabrielson involves an existing policy. Also, the court held that
"long acquaintance," several consecutive years of procuring and maintaining the same
homeowners policy, the agent's admission that it was the agent's own "responsibility,"
the fact that "most insureds are unfamiliar with their policies and rely on their agents,"
were not "special circumstances" such as would expand the duty of care on the agent. Id.
at 544-46. Finally, as mentioned earlier in this brief, this case confirms that whether an
insurance agent owes a particular duty is a question of law, not fact.
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The policy contained an unfortunate exclusion which the insured did not know about.
When the property was damaged by fire, the exclusion precluded recovery under the
policy.
The insured brought suit arguing that the agent knew the exclusion essentially gutted
the insured's policy based on the insured's circumstances. In response, the insurer argued
that the insured should have read the policy and would have noticed the exclusion. The
court held that the insurer cannot avoid liability by saying that the insured could have
discovered by reading the policy that the insurance issued was not the insurance
requested.
In Mets Donuts, Inc. v. Dairvland Insurance Company, 166 A.D.2d 508 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1990), the facts again involved an existing policy of insurance. The insured lessee of the
premises made a specific request for $75,000 in contents coverage and $10,000 for lostincome coverage. A policy was procured but the agent apparently made an error, and
procured $75,000 in premises coverage and $10,000 in contents coverage. The case has
nothing to do with whether a prospective insured's conversation with an agent was
sufficient to trigger a legal duty on the agent's part. Mets Donuts is a case regarding the
liability of an agent for securing the wrong terms of coverage, and thus is a "breach of
duty" case, not an "existence of duty" case.
In the case of Fleetwood Motors, Inc. v. John F. James & Sons, Inc., 237 N.Y.S.2d
668 (1963) cited by Harris, the prospective insured (car dealer) had made a specific
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request for auto theft insurance to an insurance broker. The broker took the order and
submitted a written application to Aetna (and had oral conversations with other insurers).
None of them wanted to insure the dealer. However, the broker forgot to notify the
insured of that fact until after several cars had been stolen.
The dealer sued the broker for failure to procure insurance. The broker offered
evidence of a letter that was purportedly sent informing the dealer that no insurer would
underwrite his property. However, the court found that the letter had been backdated and
was written after the loss occurred.
Thus, Fleetwood is a case where a broker had all the information he needed and had
already made a written attempt to place the insurance with an underwriter. The broker
apparently failed to tell the dealer that his business was not wanted. This is entirely
different from the present case where it is undisputed that Harris had not yet conveyed the
information regarding Harris' business.
All of the other cases cited by Harris on the duty to procure insurance are likewise
distinguishable, mostly involving existing policies. See Bonner v. Bank of Coushatta,
445 So. 2d 84 (Ta. Ct. App. 1984) (life insurance agreement already in place, with
premiums being paid); Lee v. Andrews, 667 P.2d 919 (Mont. 1983) (agent failed to
procure the automobile coverage after admittedly being given all the information needed
to procure the policy); Sanchez v. Martinez, 653 P.2d 897 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982) (agent
failed to renew a pre-existing homeowners' policy); Bayly, Martin & Fay. Inc v. Pete's
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Satire, Inc., 739 P.2d 239 (Colo. 1987) (though the insurance agent had knowledge that
the insured requested and required liquor liability insurance to be included in the
insurance purchased for each of his restaurants, and though the agent had included liquor
liability coverage in each restaurant policy obtained for the insured previously, the agent
nonetheless failed to include it in the insurance policy for the most recent restaurant);
South West Auto Painting and Bodv Repair, Inc. v. Binsfeld, 904 P.2d 1268 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1995) (involving a particular coverage which was not included in the policy
obtained for the insured); Precision Castparts Corp. v. Johnson & Higgins of Oregon,
Inc., 607 P.2d 763 (Or. Ct. App. 1980) (the insured specifically requested his policy
include workers compensation coverage that limited any single loss to $25,000. but the
agent failed to include this coverage in the policy procured); R.H. Grover, Inc. v. Flynn
Ins. Co., 777 P.2d 338, 341 (Mont. 1989) (cursory treatment of issue, and court found "it
is impossible to imply that Flynn [the defendant] had a 'duty' to procure insurance under
these facts," and consequently held that the trial court had erred by submitting the "failure
to procure" claim to the jury).
In summary, unlike the case at hand, the cases cited by Harris stand for the proposition
that once the essential terms of the ultimate contract of insurance have been agreed to, if
the agent then fails to execute a policy pursuant to that agreement, he can be negligent for
the failure to procure, or for failing to notify the prospective insured that no one was
willing to underwrite the specified property.
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In the present case, where there was never an agreement as to what was being
procured, and where the alleged conversation left the details for future ascertainment,
Albrecht was not under a duty toward Harris.
CONCLUSION
The only issue that went before the trial court was purely a legal one, which asked
whether, based on the facts as alleged by Harris, Albrecht had a duty or contract to
procure insurance. As with all contracts and duties, it is the province of the court to
decide whether certain undisputed words and actions are sufficient to give rise to a legal
obligation, including an obligation to procure insurance. Based on the undisputed facts of
this case, there was insufficient detail, as a matter of law, to trigger a duty or contract to
procure insurance. Defendants ask that this Court reverse the Court of Appeals' decision,
and affirm the grant of summary judgment in all respects.
DATED this P-^day of December, 2002.
STRONG & HANNI
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